Angel_Hsu100x100As promised, for the next two weeks, Angel Hsu (pictured right) and her colleagues from Yale University will be blogging live from Copenhagen. Angel Hsu is a Doctoral Student at Yale University, focusing on Chinese environmental performance measurement, policy and governance. Prior to Yale, she worked in the Climate Change and Energy Program at the World Resources Institute, a Washington-based environmental think-tank. There, she managed the GHG Protocol’s projects in China, which focused on capacity-building on greenhouse gas accounting and reporting standards for Chinese government and businesses. This post was originally featured on Green Leap Forward.

Greetings from Copenhagen! I, along with seventy Yale students, have descended upon Denmark’s capital to participate in the Fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP-15) climate talks that will hopefully result in a clearer picture of what a post-Kyoto agreement would be. This “China in Copenhagen” series of blog posts featured on The Green Leap Forward will follow China’s negotiating position during the next few weeks. We’ll shadow China’s negotiating team, speak with key experts, and report back to GLF on a daily basis.

While China has long established its negotiating position for Copenhagen, we’ve identified a set of major issues for the Chinese negotiating team at Copenhagen. A team of masters students and I (call us “Team China” if you will), have carefully reviewed the negotiating texts (non-papers in policy-speak) and developed a series of policy scenarios and strategic recommendations for how China can act as a leader in this talks to achieve an outcome that is optimal for both themselves and the global climate regime.

What are these issues?

  • Legal structure: what are the options for the legal nature (or “bindingness”) of a post-Kyoto agreement and what would be most optimal for China?
  • Financing: how will China ensure appropriate funding for its mitigation and adaptation actions?
  • Nationally-Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs): what is China currently doing to address climate change and how can they receive international recognition and support for such actions?
  • Measurable, Reportable, Verifiable (MRV): how can China build trust abroad regarding their actions to mitigate their impact on climate change in a manner that is MRV-able? What is China willing and capable of MRV-ing domestically and abroad?

My colleagues and I have drafted a white paper that makes recommendations for China’s negotiating stance on the above issues that further the nation’s environmental, economic, and political goals of achieving a circular economy and a harmonious society. The recommendations also describe how China could enhance its leadership as a world power through the international climate change regime. The recommendations can be found in the attached executive summary below:

Because we had to set a deadline for ourselves so that we could actually get our recommendations in the hands of the Chinese, our analysis unfortunately does not include China’s most recent announcement regarding its target to reduce its carbon intensity per unit GDP by 40-45 percent by 2020 (see previous post “China to adopt “binding” goal to reduce CO2 emissions per unit GDP by 40 to 45% of 2005 levels by 2020“). However, we will update our paper while at Copenhagen and when the dust settles to reflect these most recent announcements.

With Obama and Premier Wen Jiabao’s visits, the recent e-mail scandal casting doubt on the scientific validity of climate data known as “Climategate,” over 200 world leaders and 25,000 participants in attendance, this year’s COP-15 will surely be one for the ages … stay tuned.

Post-script by Julian:

Earth Negotiations Bulletin puts out comprehensive yet concise daily highlights of the the COP15 proceedings. The summary for Day 1 is here. Relevant “China” excerpts:

  • CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (COP) OPENING STATEMENTS: Sudan, for the G-77/CHINA, encouraged parties to observe the principles of good faith, transparency, inclusivity and openness, as well as an absolute commitment to the process. He emphasized the need for the agreed outcome under the AWG-LCA to ensure full implementation of developed country commitments under the Convention and rejected attempts to merge developed country commitments under the Protocol with similar actions for developing countries.
  • AD-HOC WORKING GROUP FOR LONG-TERM COOPERATION (AWG-LTC) OPENING STATEMENTS: Sudan, for the G-77/CHINA, called on parties to fulfill the mandate of the BAP and to reject attempts to shift responsibility onto developing countries.
  • COP/MOP (MEETING OF THE PARTIES) OPENING STATEMENTS: Sudan, for the G-77/CHINA, stressed that the core mandate of the ongoing negotiations is to define ambitious quantified emission reduction targets for future commitment periods. He emphasized the “huge” gap between Annex I mission reduction pledges and what is required by science, and said negotiations should result in separate agreements under the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA.
  • AD-HOC WORKING GROUP FOR KYOTO PROTOCOL (AWG-KP) OPENING STATEMENTS: Sudan, for the G-77/CHINA, expressed concern at the “insistence” of Annex I parties on a single outcome in Copenhagen and stressed that this undermines the mandate under the Bali Roadmap to finalize negotiations on: further commitments of Annex I parties for the second and subsequent commitment periods under the Protocol; and an agreed outcome under the Convention, aimed at sustained and full implementation of its provisions. He urged parties to build on the Protocol’s success by establishing more ambitious targets for the second commitment period, as well as developing means to address the potential consequences of Annex I parties’ policies and measures on developing countries. He underlined the need for an inclusive, fair, effective and equitable international climate change regime with a strong Kyoto Protocol.